House of Lords
Select Committee on Economic Affairs

The devolution of public finances in the United Kingdom

Evidence from ICAS

24 August 2015
About ICAS

1. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland ("ICAS") is the oldest professional body of accountants. We represent around 20,000 members who advise and lead businesses. Around half our members are based in Scotland, the other half work in the rest of the UK and in almost 100 countries around the world. Nearly two thirds of our members work in business, whilst a third work in accountancy practices.

2. ICAS has a public interest remit, a duty to act not solely for its members but for the wider good. Evidence provided by ICAS representatives’ aims to inform in a positive and constructive manner. ICAS is apolitical and will not take a stand for or against a particular political position. From a public interest perspective in relation to tax, our role is to share insights from ICAS members in the many complex issues and decisions involved in tax system design, and to point out operational practicalities. Our representatives also contribute based on the collective experience of decades of work which ICAS members and staff have undertaken with both the UK and Scottish Parliaments and the tax authorities on the shared agenda of a better-balanced outcome for all tax stakeholders.

General comments

3. ICAS welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the call for evidence from the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs for its inquiry into the devolution of public finances in the United Kingdom, issued in June 2015.

4. Our evidence is restricted to ICAS areas of specific expertise, covering the operational design and administration of taxation arrangements plus commentary on aspects of borrowing powers. Much of our evidence is based on our experience with the introduction of Scottish taxes.

Specific Questions: Fiscal Framework

Questions: What principles should govern the way devolved nations are funded? For example, is a new needs assessment required and if so, what should it take into account?

5. Response: we have no comments on these questions.

Questions: Is the correct institutional framework in place for the devolved governments and UK Government to discuss these matters? What processes will need to be in place to make new settlements sustainable and effective? Are there lessons the UK might take from other countries that have devolved spending and revenue raising powers?

6. Response: It will always be difficult to judge whether the correct framework is in place in which to discuss the principles of devolving powers, not least because this is a changing and evolving landscape.

7. There needs to be some form of inter-governmental machinery and this requires a delicate balancing act, which ultimately must rest upon respect, trust and common interests. The machinery needs to be designed in order to facilitate the sharing of powers between different governments, and made strong enough to be effective but without taking on the powers themselves (intentionally or otherwise). It is also the case that joint institutions can be caught in the middle, thereby becoming ineffective. As a result, inter-governmental machinery needs to operate under memorandums of understanding that are principles-based to provide clarity and transparency. They are also best served with appointments who understand both national and devolved governments and who can establish the common interests, aims and objectives.

8. Intergovernmental relations would also be strengthened if there was an Office of the Regions, or similar, so that the devolving of powers, for example to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, could be coordinated and also so that individual devolved authorities may learn from sharing experiences in a formal, coordinated forum.
9. At present, in relation to the devolution of powers to Scotland it would appear as though a significant number of governmental bodies and parliamentary committees, at both Westminster and Holyrood, are conducting work on aspects of the Smith Commission and Scotland Bill implementation. However, from our perspective it would appear at times their respective workloads are overlapping and some efforts to coordinate this should be considered.

**Question: How should block grant funding reflect devolved tax and welfare powers?**

10. Response: The Smith recommendations start from the premise that the Barnett formula will remain in place, but adjusted to reflect devolved powers. However we question whether there is currently transparency or understanding by the general public and many policy makers of the principles of the block grant allocation or the Barnett formula. Better information on this starting point would assist understanding of the adjustments to reflect tax devolution.

11. The mechanisms that are required to reflect adjustments will need to find a balance between a broad-based approach and a detailed approach. With a broad, principles-based approach it should be easier to conclude that the result should give the desired outcome. However given the starting point with the current Scotland Bill clauses is at a detailed level, a methodology of working through specific examples and illustrations will be required to ensure proper alignment with the principles-based proposals, and aimed at ensuring the desired ‘no detriment’ outcome. To have effective mechanisms will require analysis, relevant statistics, and resourcing to undertake the work.

**Questions: How should future changes to the block grant be decided? How should the Smith Commission proposal of “no detriment” apply over time?**

12. Response: Before deciding upon the mechanisms, there needs to be agreement as to what might constitute “no detriment”. In plenty discussions on this topic, there has been a lack of consensus of what might be detrimental and therefore should be taken into account in rebalancing adjustments, and what might simply be tax competition and might be part of the rationale for devolving a particular tax power.

13. Because taxes are used to deliver a wide ranging number of policies, such as to raise money, and to encourage certain behaviours, for example recycling with Scottish Landfill Tax, it may be difficult to disentangle the “no detriment” element that one would expect to analyse and calculate purely in monetary, tax raising terms.

14. This can be further affected by the contradictory policy aims of using potential tax savings, for example in UK taxes offering ISAs or capital allowances to encourage certain behaviours, but which can then be castigated as tax avoidance. Isolating what constitutes “no detriment” from such a range of policy aims will require considerable care.

15. Once such points are addressed and agreed, it may then be easier to identify the appropriate mechanisms with which to calculate and give effect to the ‘no detriment’ principle. Agreeing the appropriate adjustments at the outset will be one task, however the subsequent adjustments for later years are likely to be increasingly difficult to determine.

**Questions: Should devolved governments receive further borrowing powers? What form of contract between the UK government and the devolved nations will prevent bailouts of governments that do not stick to their borrowing limits?**

16. Response: We have considered the issue of borrowing powers in our responses to other inquiries on the devolution of further powers to Scotland. Our focus in those previous responses has been on the need for additional borrowing powers for preventative spend to be considered as part of any negotiations between the UK and Scottish Governments.

17. Our comments have been in the context of our support for a shift from crisis spending towards preventative spending by the public services and we have similarly limited our comments here to this aspect of additional borrowing powers.
18. We do not comment on the extent to which borrowing powers should be increased to accommodate revenue borrowing for preventative spending as this would be a matter for negotiation between the Scottish and UK Governments nor do we comment on how constitutional arrangements should be revised to accommodate the additional borrowing powers proposed in the Smith Commission Agreement.

19. However, borrowing must be affordable (for the jurisdiction undertaking the borrowing), sustainable and prudent and should be shared proportionately with future generations. Therefore, borrowing powers, in the context of the fiscal framework must be structured with these principles in mind whether these are exercised to fund shortfalls in taxation revenue, investment in assets or for preventative spending.

**Borrowing for preventative spending**

20. At present Scottish local authorities can borrow to fund capital within the bounds of the Prudential Code and the Scotland Act 2012 gives limited borrowing powers over capital and revenue which are expected to be extended further following the implementation of the Smith Commission Agreement.

21. The draft clauses of the Scotland Bill do not cover the devolution of the additional borrowing powers which are referred to in the Smith Commission Agreement. The omission of any reference to borrowing powers from the draft clauses reflects the detailed work that needs to be undertaken by both the UK and Scottish Governments to agree an overall fiscal framework for Scotland that is acceptable to both parties and both parliaments.

22. In our evidence to the Smith Commission and to the Scottish Parliament’s Finance Committee we recommended that the Scottish Government should have additional revenue borrowing powers to fund preventative spending.

23. We have approached this recommendation from the perspective that additional monies are needed to shift the balance between crisis spending on public services to preventative spending in order to achieve longer term savings.

24. During this extended period of public spending restraint and increasing demand for public services, we support the development and roll out of arrangements which support a preventative spend agenda to achieve better outcomes for communities over the longer term. However, if transformational change is to take place within our public services, we believe that further revenue borrowing powers than have been articulated so far are needed.

25. Neither the Smith Commission report nor HM Government’s ‘Scotland in the United Kingdom: An enduring settlement’ refer to preventative spending in their respective commentaries on borrowing powers. Therefore, in our view, the reports could not be interpreted as permitting revenue borrowing to fund the revenue aspects of preventative spend.

26. Borrowing for capital projects has always been viewed as preferable to borrowing to fund revenue expenditure on public services due to the benefits accrued from capital expenditure being spread over more than one financial year. A key overarching objective of preventative spending initiatives is to reduce demand for public services and create future savings. Therefore, preventative spending, like capital spending, is about investing in the future. We believe this provides clear justification for the extension of the Scottish Government’s revenue borrowing powers to fund preventative spend initiatives within prescribed limits.

27. Charities are major providers of public services and we believe that there is knowledge and experience within this sector which is vital to the success of preventative spending approaches. While there are a number of barriers to taking forward preventative spend initiatives, some of which could be overcome within the existing devolved arrangements, we believe that further revenue borrowing powers need to be devolved to support a shift away from crisis spend.
28. The debt financing of charities by government is a potential model for providing working capital to charities for preventative spend initiatives. However, debt financing, where interest is charged below commercial rates, has the potential to be caught by the EU State Aid rules. The State Aid rules were created to promote competition and control state subsidy levels so as to maintain a level playing field across Europe. In practice, this means that government funding such as grants to a small enterprise, the creation of targeted tax reliefs to stimulate economic growth or investing in a framework to facilitate a move towards more preventative spending could be classed as ‘State Aid’ if certain criteria and tests are met.

29. Preventative spending does not guarantee success and therefore there are risks attached to it. Nevertheless, we believe that it is appropriate for the Scottish Government to be able to borrow to fund the revenue aspects of preventative spend initiatives, within an overall cash limit, where there is a realistic prospect of achieving savings. The resultant savings could reduce public spending in the long-term or free up resources which could be re-deployed elsewhere in the public services.

30. In addition to placing an overall cash limit (or introducing a mechanism to establish and overall limit) on the amount the Scottish Government can borrow for preventative spending initiatives, we would envisage that borrowings would need to be repaid within a specified period of time and that governance arrangements would include measures to ensure that borrowings could not be used to fund recurrent revenue expenditure.

Questions: What would the implications be of full fiscal autonomy for Scotland? How would Scotland shrink any fiscal gap?

31. Response: we have no comments on these questions.

What implications will the renegotiation of the fiscal framework for Scotland have on Wales and Northern Ireland?

32. Response: we have no comments on this question.

Specific questions: Tax powers

Question: What is the rationale behind the choice of taxes proposed to be devolved in the Scotland Bill?

33. Response: The Scotland Act 2012 has already led to the devolution of some taxes and the Scotland Bill builds on this, with the overall result of devolving taxes further being three different levels and/or types of devolved taxes:

a. Full devolution - Land and Buildings Transaction Tax, Scottish Landfill Tax, Aggregates Levy and Air Passenger Duty. These taxes are, or will be, the political responsibility of the Scottish Parliament and the administrative duties rest with the new tax authority, Revenue Scotland. The nature of the taxes, the legislation, and the associated collection and management duties are fully devolved and completely the responsibility of those in Scotland.

b. Partial devolution - Income Tax rates and bands. Partially devolved taxes involve joint responsibilities. Political responsibility will be split between the UK and Scottish Parliaments. The UK Parliament will be responsible for the tax base (what is considered to be income, and how it is measured) and the Scottish Parliament is responsible for the rates and the bands (how much is assessed for collection). Administrative responsibility will remain with HMRC, for which the Scottish Government will pay any additional costs of collection.

The Scottish income tax rates will be applied to earned income, pensions and rental income, but will not be charged on savings income and dividend income (to ease administrative pressures and to avoid distortions of the UK savings market).
c. **Assignment** – a proportion of VAT receipts. VAT remains the responsibility of the EU (in terms of defining the tax base), and the UK Parliament (in setting the tax rates), with administration and collection by HMRC. A proportion of VAT collected is to be assigned to Scotland.

34. We understand that from an operational, procedural basis the rationale for the different types of devolved tax powers includes the following:

a. Fully devolved taxes are standalone taxes that do not have significant interaction with other taxes so they lend themselves to being devolved. Also, they have their locus in Scotland and are unlikely therefore to give rise to jurisdictional issues.

b. Partial devolution of income tax. Income tax is one of the major sources of government revenue and therefore the devolution of it should provide accountability for tax raising with the Scottish Parliament. Both the Scotland Act 2012 Scottish Rate of Income Tax and, in future, the proposed Smith recommendations combine a pragmatic way of devolving elements of income tax whilst retaining the UK infrastructure of tax collection with HMRC and employers, thereby avoiding the costs and efforts of whole-scale change.

c. Assigned VAT. The purpose of the assignment of VAT is to align tax income with the Scottish economy. How accountability to the Scottish Parliament is arrived at through assignment has yet to be decided, and is not determined or directed in the draft tax clauses in the Scotland Bill. Considerable analytical and statistical work will be required if there is to be an amount that can be identified which truly reflects the VAT attributable to Scotland and will in future reflect any changes in the Scottish economy.

35. ICAS recommended that the following key principles should be used to determine the decision basis for the devolution of new powers:

a. Achieve clear objectives, such as the speed of delivery of devolved powers to meet voters expectations whilst accepting trade-offs are likely to be necessary.

b. Be transparent to voters, whether delivery is in the short term or managing expectations for the longer term.

c. Avoid complex outcomes, by devolving powers whilst avoiding potentially problematic interactions with non-devolved powers.

d. Minimise burdens on employers and businesses, because many taxes are collected at source and significant costs of administration could fall on those unpaid collectors.

e. Maximise benefits in relation to costs for taxpayers, including assessments of HMRC’s/Revenue Scotland’s capacity and capability to deliver and the likely net revenue impact on Scotland’s finances.

36. The rationale for devolving certain taxes may not be easy to put forward to the public and there is great scope for confusion in public understanding. In public usage most commentators tend to use the phrases “Scottish taxes” or “devolved taxes” but these encompass different types of devolution and varying amounts of responsibilities, and can lack precision. The rationale for, and the nature of, the powers over income tax are fundamentally different from those devolved by, for example, Land and Buildings Transaction Tax. Hence, fairness and transparency may take time in being achieved for the public at large.
37. We note too that aspects of devolving taxes are beginning to impact on UK taxes. In the UK Spring Budget it was announced that a new Personal Savings Allowance is to be introduced with effect from 6 April 2016. This will apply across the UK and is estimated by HMRC to remove 95% of taxpayers from the charge to income tax on savings. Alongside the announcement in the Summer Budget about dividend income, this should ease the administration of tax for those higher rate Scottish taxpayers who receive savings and/or dividend income and would otherwise have had to account for further UK income tax through a tax return. Scottish taxpayers with significant levels of savings and/or dividend income will, however, have the additional complication and expense of reporting these to the UK tax authorities and ensuring that the right rates of tax are applied to their income.

Question: What is the rationale behind the choice of taxes devolved by the Wales Act 2014?

38. Response: we have no comments on this question.

Questions: What are the implications of devolving corporation tax to Northern Ireland? Will it have an effect on business in the rest of the UK?

39. Response: the devolving of corporation tax has re-opened some discussion in Scotland as to whether corporation tax should also be devolved to Scotland. ICAS has reservations about the devolution of corporation tax which could lead to tax competition and this is discussed further below.

Questions: With the above measures in place, will Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have the correct tax raising powers? Should other taxes be devolved (for example corporation tax to Scotland and Wales)?

40. Response: It is too soon to judge whether further powers should be considered and the existing package of tax powers should be given time to be exercised and become fully operational.

41. A key driver to the devolution of tax powers is the accountability of the Scottish Parliament and it is considered that this is more likely to be achieved through taxes other than corporation tax, and particularly those with a closer connection to the electorate. However, reservations have been expressed by some of our members that if income tax is to become ‘Scottish’ this may mean that it will be hypothecated to devolved responsibilities such as health and education. In due course this may influence the manner in which the different taxes do, or do not, provide accountability between the electorate and politicians.

42. We have attached as an appendix an ICAS paper on VAT and the public sector, which was issued in December 2014. It raises a number of issues around VAT recovery by different parts of the public sector. This issue may be aggravated if a dispute is seen to be between a devolved part of the public sector and the central HMRC authority.

Question: Will devolution of tax powers lead to competition between Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and England?

43. Response: The impact of tax competition can be seen with some of the fully devolved taxes and has already happened, for example, when Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) structure and rates were changed in December 2014 and Land and Buildings Transactions Tax (LBTT) rates in Scotland subsequently changed. This resulted in:
   a. Less tax being raised at a UK level;
   b. A lower block grant adjustment;
   c. Greater differences in tax outcomes; leading to a debate on whether a particular outcome is tax competition or might be a part of the ‘no detriment’ analysis; and
   d. Behavioural impacts by taxpayers, for example, a lower level of sales in the upper end of the property market and possibly more activity at the lower end of the property market.

44. The rates of Scottish Landfill Tax have been kept the same as in the rest of the UK so that there will not be any opportunity for ‘waste tourism’. Competition is seen as unhelpful in this context, but if there is very little difference in the devolved tax it begs the question of whether there is a need to devolve it.
45. There is already tax competition with Air Passenger Duty, as identified in the recent ‘Discussion Paper on options for supporting English regional airports from the impacts of air passenger duty devolution’ published by HMT in July 2015.

46. In the context of Scotland, ICAS has expressed reservations about the devolution of corporation tax as it is likely this would lead to tax competition. This is discussed further in the next response.

Question: Would competition be welcome?

47. Response: A tax system works on a number of complex and interrelated principles and interactions and to date this has been balanced across the UK tax system. In terms of international business, the principle of aiming for stability and certainty in tax matters at a UK level has been greatly welcomed as a means of making the UK more competitive on the international stage.

48. Generally, most people do not like paying tax and, given a legal and legitimate choice, they are likely to opt to pay less tax rather than more. There are extensive provisions in the UK tax legislation to prevent tax leakage both between different UK taxes, and to other jurisdictions. The individual behavioural approaches and responses to the tax environment could reasonably be assumed to continue should devolved taxes differ between different parts of the UK, which may in turn lead to reduced tax revenues or require additional legislative provisions to protect the revenue.

49. Tax competition is one element that can be used to attract investment and encourage certain behaviours. However, there can be downsides to tax competition such as:

a. If a tax is devolved to Scotland but its tax base is not clear cut then this can create significant new complexities and administrative burdens. For example, many companies operate across the UK and it may not always be easy to isolate profits from different jurisdictions. Consequently, the devolution of a relatively mobile tax such as corporation tax could lead to disputes between taxpayers and the tax authorities about the correct taxing jurisdiction, transfer pricing, double tax relief etc. Different corporation tax rates between Scotland and other parts of the UK would lead to the same issues that currently exist with international tax and its payment to the appropriate authorities.

b. Tax competition is usually effected by reducing rates or offering attractive reliefs from tax but this can encourage a damaging “race to the bottom” between different jurisdictions which would reduce tax receipts for both the Scottish and UK Governments.

c. Tax competition can also lead to tax avoidance and tax planning. For example, tax can be more competitive in one jurisdiction compared to another in order to attract inward investment or the use of, say, a particular airport. The attraction to the potential taxpayer is a reduction in their tax bill, but it also encourages that taxpayer to avoid a less competitive tax. Equally, tax competition can be between different taxes. For instance, if corporation taxes are lowered there is an incentive for any unincorporated business to seek to convert sources liable to income tax into profits that are liable to corporation tax. In the eyes of some, this is also tax avoidance.

50. There will always be a balance to be struck between the desire for taxes that are specifically designed for local circumstances and local accountability, and which support the economy, but at the same time provide ease of administration for taxpayers, businesses that collect taxes on behalf of the state, and the tax authorities. Ease of administration tends to come from uniformity and certainty.

51. Tax competition can also become tied up with ‘no detriment’ debates if the competition in one part of the UK turns out to be detrimental to another part. At the heart of the ‘no detriment’ principle is the notion that the impact of policy decisions taken in one part of the UK do not impact adversely on the funding of public services in another part. Arguably, the ‘no detriment’ principle runs counter to encouraging tax competition.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is time to take a fresh look at the UK VAT regime for the public sector. Changes to the way in which public services are delivered, together with public spending restrictions, have highlighted the impact of VAT on decision making across the sector. Too often it seems the focus is on HMRC getting the maximum amount of tax from the public sector, rather than efficient delivery of services.

ICAS members consider it is time to review the current VAT regime for the public sector to address the following issues:

- The differing VAT status of parts of the public sector under the UK rules gives a VAT recovery shelter to some organisations but not other organisations delivering the same services to the same end users. There are strong arguments to suggest that the UK VAT system for the public sector is not fiscally neutral.

- The Autumn Statement on 3 December 2014 included five separate announcements to adjust the VAT status of various bodies delivering public services. The need to make this number of changes illustrates the piecemeal way of addressing these concerns and indicates that a broader review of VAT and the public sector is needed. This call is not new - it was also outlined in the Monitor report on “A fair playing field for the benefit of NHS patients” in March 2013.

- The differences in VAT recovery act as a disincentive to implement new and innovative service delivery models across the public sector. Moving activities traditionally delivered by an organisation within a VAT shelter to a new organisation unable to benefit from VAT recovery these will increase the costs of providing that service by 20% before any other changes are contemplated.

- The administration of VAT in the public sector should be carried out by a specialist team within HMRC to harness expertise in dealing with the complex VAT issues involved along with an understanding of the bigger picture. We have outlined below the complexity of the VAT rules applying to the public sector; having a specialist team can help alleviate some of the complexities and help the public sector get its VAT position right more of the time.

- The public sector procurement rules have raised issues about the planning undertaken by the sector to minimise the impact of taxes on their operations. There are conflicting demands on the sector from the interaction of these rules with the need to get the best possible return for public expenditure. Coherent clarification is needed of the procurement rules, particularly around what are considered “artificial avoidance schemes”. We would suggest looking at the types of planning outlined in this document to illustrate “safe harbour” arrangements that are accepted to allow VAT recovery.

- The money to fund large parts of the public sector comes from tax revenues and disputes between HMRC and the public sector about VAT can give the impression that vital public resources are being used to fund what appear to be internal or trivial issues. It is in the interests of all parties to make the system work effectively and deliver good public services and the intended tax outcomes.
1. BACKGROUND

In April 2014 ICAS responded to a consultation issued by the European Commission on the impact of the current VAT system on public sector organisations. This project identified a number of areas in the UK’s system where the current rules give rise to distortions in the way that different parts of the public sector are subject to VAT on essentially the same transaction. ICAS has been asked by its members to look in more detail at the position and identify areas where the UK Government should focus its attention on ensuring a level playing field across the public sector.

Our focus in this area has also been informed by the public sector procurement rules. These rules were changed from 1 April 2013 for central government contracts of more than £5 million and require bidders for these contracts to self-certify their tax compliance as part of the tender process. The introduction of these rules has had an impact across the public sector and many organisations find themselves in the position of needing to include information on tax compliance on tenders to national governments. This is against a background where there may be strategies adopted by public sector organisations to maximise VAT recovery that appear to be in contravention of this rule, even where these are treated as acceptable tax planning by HMRC.

Definition of public sector

The term “public sector” needs to be clarified. We are using this term in this paper to cover all not for profit organisations as the VAT issues are common across the sector. We have used the term to include:

- Central Government.
- Local Government.
- The public health sector – the NHS.
- The public education sector.
- The charitable sector.

2. UK LEGISLATION – CATEGORISATION OF VAT ENTITIES

The UK has applied article 13 of the European Directive by implementing specific rules regarding the VAT treatment of public sector organisations which splits these organisations into four types:

- Local Authorities and similar organisations (including the BBC) – section 33 VATA 1994 allows these organisations to recover all VAT incurred on activities related to the non-business functions of the organisation. There can be issues where the organisation receives non-statutory sources of income where these new activities are outside the scope of section 33.

- Government departments and the NHS and associated organisations – Section 41 VATA 1994 allows these organisations to recover input VAT in certain circumstances but they cannot recover VAT on non-business activities. The Treasury lists the services on which these departments are able to receive funding to compensate for irrecoverable VAT in the London, Edinburgh and Belfast Gazette.

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1 A copy can be found at [http://icas.org.uk/Technical-Knowledge/Tax/Consultations-and-Submissions/](http://icas.org.uk/Technical-Knowledge/Tax/Consultations-and-Submissions/)

2 The text of the Article is as follows:

“States, regional and local government authorities and other bodies governed by public law shall not be regarded as taxable persons in respect of the activities or transactions in which they engage as public authorities, even where they collect dues, fees, contributions or payments in connection with those activities or transactions.

However, when they engage in such activities or transactions, they shall be regarded as taxable persons in respect of those activities or transactions where their treatment as non-taxable persons would lead to significant distortions of competition.

In any event, bodies governed by public law shall be regarded as taxable persons in respect of the activities listed in Annex 1, provided that those activities are not carried out on such a small scale as to be negligible.”
Other public sector organisations – these are organisations that do not have any specific provisions that allow them to recover VAT on their activities which are for the public good. These organisations use the standard income method to split their activities between business and non-business, and operate an appropriate partial exemption method to determine what input tax can be recovered. In the UK organisations dealt with under these arrangements are mainly charities, housing associations, universities. In effect, these public sector bodies are not treated under article 13 as they are not “bodies governed by public law” as defined by the Principal VAT Directive.

Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) which are effectively a separate category for VAT purposes. These are organisations which have a role in the processes of government, but are not a Government Department or part of one, and which accordingly operate to a greater or lesser extent at arm’s length from Ministers. As these organisations are separate from central government they do not benefit from the section 41 treatment unless they are Crown NPDBs. An NDPB is only able to register for VAT where it makes taxable supplies and can only recover VAT in connection with those supplies and its residual input tax allocated to those supplies under the partial exemption method adopted. This can be a very complex area as the funding of NDPBs relies on grants from Government and often this funding is calculated on the basis that VAT can be recovered in line with section 41 VAT 1994. It is only once plans to transfer services to the NDPB are advanced that VAT is considered and there can be significant issues to overcome in this area.

3. IMPACT OF UK LEGISLATION ON CATEGORISATION

To demonstrate how these regimes would work in practice, consider the example of an organisation in each category incurs £1,000,000 input tax on implementing a new payroll solution across the organisation where the work was outsourced to an external contractor. The VAT recovery position would be:

- Local authority – would be able to recover the £1,000,000 in full under the terms of section 33.
- Central government, NHS – would be able to recover the £1,000,000 in full under the terms of section 41 provided the services were covered by the Treasury List.
- Other public sector organisations – universities, charities etc – if the organisation was able to be VAT registered the £1,000,000 input VAT would be treated as belonging in the partial exemption “pot”. Partial exemption is the method used to allocate input tax incurred on general activities in proportion to an organisations ratio of taxable supplies to total supplies. These types of organisations will have predominantly exempt supplies so full recovery is not possible. Assuming a recovery rate of 15% (this figure is illustrative of the VAT recovery rate for the sector) would mean that the organisation would only be able to recover £150,000 of the VAT incurred, leaving it with a balance of £850,000 to cover with funding from other sources.
- NDPBs - if the organisation was able to be VAT registered the £1,000,000 input VAT would be treated as belonging in the partial exemption “pot” with similar issues as above. The partial exemption rules would apply to these organisations but as they carry out government functions which are non-business for VAT, they are unlikely to have very significant levels of taxable supplies. Assuming a recovery rate of 5% (this figure is illustrative of the VAT recovery rate for the sector) would mean that the organisation would only be able to recover £50,000 of the VAT incurred, leaving it with a balance of £950,000 to cover with funding from other sources.

This example demonstrates the wide variation across the public sector and the value to the organisations of the statutory shelters in sections 33 and 41. It also illustrate the issues associated with transferring responsibilities from within government to new organisations – either NDPBs or other types of organisations – and the impact on funding for the new organisations.

The VAT cost is a significant burden, and at the moment these rules act as a disincentive to implementing new strategies for delivering public services. There is not a level playing field across the public sector and we believe it is time to address this issue within the UK.
To try and illustrate how this affects the running of the public sector we have looked at two scenarios where the same transaction carried on by bodies with differing status has a very different tax impact.
1. **Categorisation example 1 – social housing**

The first example is the provision of social housing which is exempt from VAT in the UK. Where the housing is provided by a local authority they are able to recover the VAT incurred on repairs and maintenance under the generous partial exemption de minimis rules available to local authorities. If the same housing is provided to the same tenant by a Housing Association they are not able to recover these amounts of VAT. A Housing Association is generally a not-for-profit body which may have charitable status and is likely to receive public money; many evolved from the outsourcing of social housing provision in the UK.

The VAT anomaly can lead to issues when there are transfers of social housing stock from the local authority sector and where the successor landlord does not benefit from the local authorities’ VAT shelter outlined above. This can result in convoluted structures to allow the repair and maintenance obligations to remain with the local authority so that VAT can be recovered as the cost of making a complete transfer of all obligations is the 20% of VAT incurred on repairs and maintenance. There are significant professional and legal costs associated with structuring the transaction in this way. The bulk of these costs are on the initial transaction but there are on-going compliance costs.

To give some idea of the financial impact of the VAT in these cases we have looked at the VAT costs of refurbishment programmes under housing stock transfers from Glasgow City Council. The technical issue concerned the recovery of VAT on future refurbishment costs associated with the social housing. As noted, housing associations do not fall into the section 33 shelter available to local authorities and cannot recover VAT incurred on refurbishment work. The additional cost of this VAT threatened the financial viability of the transfer of social housing stock and the third party funders pushed for action to mitigate this cost so the transfer could proceed. A structure was designed, with HMRC consent, to effectively allow the cost of refurbishment to remain with the local authority.

Glasgow Housing Association acquired the social housing stock of Glasgow City Council in 2003 with an intended budget of £1.47 billion for refurbishment costs. The level of future costs anticipated on refurbishments where Glasgow Housing Association includes both the debtor due from Glasgow City Council and the creditor for future upgrades disclosed at 2012 is £250 million.

As indicated by the example above, it is possible to enter into contractual arrangements which benefit from the VAT recovery position of the local authorities. However, without detailed approval from HMRC this type of tax planning could be seen as falling foul of the guidelines included in the Treasury document “Managing Public Money” issued in April 2013 which states at paragraph 5.6.1:

> “Public sector organisations should not engage in, or connive at, tax evasion, tax avoidance or tax planning…… artificial avoidance schemes should normally be rejected”.

The guidance notes that tax advisers can be used for normal compliance activity but it casts doubt on the ability of Government bodies, including NDPBs, to adopt planning strategies which are justifiable in terms of deliverables and governance if one of the aims is also to maximise the VAT recovery on their activities. There is a tension between this requirement and the need to use public money effectively. Paying more tax than is required could be the result of this tension.
2. Categorisation example 2 – “relevant residential purpose” or “relevant charitable purpose”

The other example to consider is the provision of accommodation for “relevant residential purposes” or “relevant charitable purposes”. Where the developments falls within either of these categories the construction work will be zero-rated with no VAT cost charged on construction costs from the main contractor. This zero-rating covers most work on student accommodation for Universities and work for charities on providing premises to be used for the non-business activities of the charity.

On substantial capital projects of this nature there are normally significant costs from architects, surveyors and other consultants which cannot be treated as part of the construction and are subject to VAT at 20%. If these costs are incurred by either a university or charity the VAT incurred would not be recoverable.

The approach to this that has been used is for the university/charity to set up a separate subsidiary to act as the main contractor on a design and build contract for the organisation. This structure allows the subsidiary to use the composite supply rules to zero-rate the whole supply it makes to the organisation – so it is able to recover all the VAT incurred on associated architects, surveyors’ etc. costs. Using a separate subsidiary is the method used to ring-fence the property activity and make sure that the VAT can be recovered while giving the organisation the control over the appointment of main contractors on the project and apply for funding for the project while under the control of the organisation.

This is a normal planning strategy, and has been accepted by HMRC. HMRC reviewed the position in 2011 as a result of the Talacre case at the European Court of Justice (C-251/05) and after discussion with the Charity Tax Group decided that the treatment as a composite supply would be available for zero-rated construction services in Group 5 Schedule 8 VATA 1994. The Charity Tax Group took Counsel’s opinion on the issue as part of their discussions on the issue and HMRC accepted that the Talacre judgement did not affect the approach in these particular circumstances.
3. PUBLIC SECTOR PROCUREMENT RULES

As the planning for transfer of housing stock outlined above demonstrates, this is tax planning by the public sector to enhance VAT recovery. The procurement rules across the whole public sector will require organisations to consider whether they can justify the use of this type of planning to eliminate VAT costs on property transactions. To the man in street, the use of a single purpose vehicle property development company can look like part of an avoidance scheme and using this type of structure does not add to overall transparency. There is now a tension between planning for financial viability and the need to be seen to be tax compliant even if this would mean a higher tax bill for the organisation.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITIES

4.1 Business and non-business activities

There are further layers of complexity in VAT recovery for public sector organisations in dealing with VAT. The first step is that these organisations will be involved in splitting their activities between business activities and non-business activities. This is a complex area in itself and there is a wealth of case law that covers the issue, along with a full manual of guidance for HMRC staff at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/vbnbmanual/index.htm.

4.2 Partial exemption

Once this has been calculated the organisation then has to consider its partial exemption position applicable to its business supplies. A large number of public sector organisations are partially exempt – their supplies for VAT purposes include both taxable supplies and exempt supplies – and they are required to agree a formula with HMRC for apportioning the input VAT that is incurred across the business activities of the organisation between its taxable activities and its exempt activities.

This can be a very complex process and involves work to ensure that the accounting system and the staff who operate the system can distinguish between taxable and exempt supplies and purchases. For example, it becomes important that income from car parking activities is allocated to either taxable or exempt for some organisations. The operation of the partial exemption scheme is dependent on this level of detail being available to complete the calculation for all public sector bodies.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITY PARTICULAR TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR

There are a number of areas where there are particular problems for public sector bodies as a result of the complexity of UK VAT regulations and this paper will now go on to consider these in more detail to give a flavour of the types of issues that these organisations have to deal with in practice. The examples to be covered are:

- Issues around prescribing within the NHS.
- Issues around cost sharing across the public sector.
1. **Administrative complexity example 1 - prescribing within the NHS**

The NHS is treated in a very complex way by the VAT rules and their interpretation by HMRC. We are focusing on the issue of prescribing within the NHS as a discrete issue but in the bigger picture the rules around partial exemption calculations and the interaction with contracted out services cause significant practical issues for the day to day running of the NHS. The HMRC guidance on this issue is here [http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/menus/frame-nhs.pdf](http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/menus/frame-nhs.pdf) and gives some flavour of the issues and problems associated with this area.

As noted above the NHS is a section 41 organisation and is able to recover input VAT in certain circumstances. For most of the organisations covered by section 41 the supplies they make are outside the scope of VAT or exempt so there is no requirement to account for VAT.

Prescription services offered by the NHS are zero-rated for VAT in certain circumstances under Group 12 of Schedule VATA 1994. This means that the VAT incurred in purchasing the medicine can be recovered while there is no VAT to be accounted for on any prescription charges.

The UK legislation in this area applies the zero-rating as follows:

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1) the supply of any qualifying goods dispensed to an individual for that individual's personal use on the prescription of an appropriate practitioner where the dispensing is:
   a) By a registered pharmacist; or
   b) In accordance with a requirement or other authorisation under a relevant provision”.
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There is HMRC guidance which defines the terms used in the legislation so that most prescriptions issued under the NHS prescribing guidelines fall into this zero-rating. It is worth noting that drugs and medicines supplied in hospital are treated as part of a supply of healthcare to the patient which is outside the scope of VAT and the VAT incurred by the hospital on these drugs and medicines cannot be recovered by the NHS.

However, there are developments in the ways that prescriptions are issued by the NHS in line with policies to try and reduce the pressure on general practitioner workloads. One of the areas that is causing difficulties from a VAT perspective is prescribing by local clinics for medicines to be used by non-named individuals, and thus outside condition one. This occurs for many emergency prescriptions such as for drug treatment where the clinic is not able to get a suitable prescription for the individual. If the conditions cannot be met, the supply is treated as standard-rated so that the clinic is required to account for VAT on the cost of the drugs or medicine and this can create significant problems.

There are plans to expand the powers of local clinics in this area, and it is likely that they will be able to issue emergency prescriptions for a wider range of drugs and medicines, including expensive cancer treatment drugs. This additional VAT cost will have significant impact on funding for the NHS and it is vital that HMRC adapt their guidance to ensure that it reflects an up to date approach to prescribing within the NHS.
### 2. Administrative complexity example 2 - cost sharing across the public sector

In July 2012 legislation was passed that allows an independent group of persons to form cost-sharing groups to provide shared services without charging VAT in line with Article 132.1(F) of the Principal VAT Directive. Until this legislation was introduced, organisations were able to set up cost-sharing groups but the services provided by the cost-sharing group were subject to VAT which is a disincentive where organisations are not able to fully recover VAT. The legislation is intended to combat this position and allows the cost-sharing group to treat its services as exempt from VAT. This VAT exemption gives the group the scope to realise the savings of shared services without the additional VAT costs.

The UK legislation is rules based and is included in Group 16 Schedule 9 VATA 1994. The primary conditions are as follows:

- There must be an independent group of persons supplying services to persons who are its members.
- All the members must carry on VAT exempt and non-business activity.
- The services supplied by the cost-sharing group must be directly necessary for a member’s exempt and/or non-business activity.
- The Cost-sharing group must only recover the member’s individual share of the expenses incurred by the cost-sharing group in making supplies to its members.
- The application of the exemption to the supplies made by the cost-sharing group must not likely to cause a distortion of competition.

As with most rules-based tax legislation the terms used are further defined, and these impose additional conditions for organisations who are considering whether a cost-sharing group would be appropriate to their circumstances. The conditions outlined above include a requirement that the services supplied are “directly necessary” to a members exempt and/or non-business. HMRC interpret this as requiring that the organisation has exempt/non-business activity which represents at least 85% of the total activities.

For many Higher Education Institutions and charities, this limit is very problematic as they are actively involved in trying to generate more business income to address funding concerns – through business partnerships, holiday rentals, consultancy work etc. The conflicting demands of funding issues for the organisation may mean that it cannot satisfy this test and it cannot be involved in cost-sharing groups. The 85% threshold is not included in the Principal VAT Directive and was included by HMRC primarily to prevent organisations with higher levels of taxable activity using this as an opportunity to manage their VAT position.

The conditions outlined also illustrate the complexity of the legislation for the public sector. To be able to determine if they are within the conditions the organisation must undertake a number of calculations using accurate and reliable information and understand all the strands of its activities. This ought to be straightforward – but as recent Tribunal cases such as Brockenhurst College TC02569 demonstrate, this is still an area where organisations need to keep up to date with developments.

This rules based interpretation of the Principal VAT Directive into UK legislation illustrates some of the major issues for the public sector. The UK legislation is driven by rules rather than principles and these particular rules narrow down at each stage of the process the organisations that are eligible for the shelter provided. The legislation does not focus on helping organisations to cost-share and includes anti-avoidance rules within the relief granted – the 85% test and the requirement that this exemption does not distort competition. The underlying attitude which appears to be evidenced by the legislation is that organisations are trying to take advantage of the VAT system, when in fact most organisations are trying to understand and comply with their responsibilities under the UK’s tax laws.
CONCLUSION AND CALLS TO ACTION

This paper has examined the distortions in the operation of the UK VAT system and their impact across the public sector. The current situation does not give a level playing field and many of the distortions give rise to financial issues for public sector operations. The real challenge is to find a system for dealing with the VAT affairs of the sector which is less complex for both the taxpayer and HMRC – the examples above illustrate the complexities that face the sector when dealing with VAT issues.

There is a very strong argument for HMRC to treat the public sector as a special sector administratively and have dedicated resources allocated to dealing with the issues from this sector. We are aware of HMRC’s diminishing resources and recognise the need for careful allocation of those resources to the areas which carry most risk. The value of transactions within the public sector is itself a risk and public bodies themselves do not often have internal resource with sufficient knowledge to deal with complex VAT queries. This can result in very difficult decisions when organisational finances are being considered. A dedicated team which is open to discussion with both public bodies and their external advisers would be able to make better use of their resources in managing the sector.

A dedicated team would be more aware of the bigger picture for the sector and have an understanding of the wider impact. An example of this in the past was the HMRC dedicated NHS team, which met with external advisers on a quarterly basis and issued newsletters on current VAT issues to NHS Trusts and Boards to ensure consistent compliance across the sector. These newsletters gave the NHS bodies and their advisers clear informed guidance on the VAT treatment of transactions, and allowed HMRC to focus on the exceptional transactions rather than the day to day transactions. We understand from our members that there are concerns that the public sector is now seen as a “soft touch” for HMRC staff.

The UK tax system has not adapted to the changes in the way that public services are delivered in the UK, particularly under single outcome agreements, and often new methods of delivery are not able to use the shelters of section 33 or section 41. The planning to try to allow some of those benefits to remain can mean very significant professional costs and even disputes between the organisation and HMRC.

As noted in the executive summary, there were 5 announcements in the Autumn Statement on 3 December 2014 to adjust the VAT recovery status of various bodies delivering public services. The changes cover:

- Hospices – paragraph 2.20 of the Autumn Statement
- UK search and rescue and air ambulance charities – paragraph 2.80 of the Autumn Statement
- Highways Agency – paragraph 2.107 of the Autumn Statement
- Certain Government departments – paragraph 2.108 of the Autumn Statement
- London Legacy Development Corporation – paragraph 2.109 of the Autumn Statement

The need to make these changes is driven by the underlying issues in the UK VAT legislation covering the public sector. It is time to consider a full review rather than make occasional changes for certain organisations.

There needs to be recognition of the amount of public money that is devoted to these issues and for a review of the whole system for dealing with VAT and the public sector. The piecemeal approach adopted to date has meant that HMRC do not keep pace with changes in the sector. A new approach that looked at principles rather than rules would benefit this sector and provide a system that is better able to deal with the challenges facing the public sector and its finances.